Archive for the 'Internet Outages' Category

CRA Congressional visit to Washington D.C.

Tuesday, September 27th, 2016 by kc

As part of a Computing Research Association (CRA) effort to introduce policymakers to the contributions and power of IT research for the nation and the world, this month I had the honor of visiting with the offices of four U.S. senators and a U.S. Representative:

Internet-specific topics I discussed included the importance of scientific measurement infrastructure to support empirical network and security research, broadband policy, and Internet governance.

We left them with a terrific infographic from the National Academy study “Continuing Innovation in Information Technology“, which shows the economic impact of different areas of fundamental IT research. The 2-pager flyer and the whole National Academy report, Depicting Innovation in Information Technology, is available on the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine Computer Science Telecommunications Board (CSTB) site.
Continuing Innovation in Information Technology

Even with many folks in Congress having a higher priority of passing a budget and getting back home to their districts to prepare for elections, all the staffers were gracious and genuinely interested in our field. (Who wouldn’t be? ūüėČ )

Kudos to the Computing Research Association for providing a wonderful opportunity to engage with policy folks.

CAIDA’s 2015 Annual Report

Tuesday, July 19th, 2016 by kc

[Executive summary and link below]

The CAIDA annual report summarizes CAIDA’s activities for 2015, in the areas of research, infrastructure, data collection and analysis. Our research projects span Internet topology, routing, security, economics, future Internet architectures, and policy. Our infrastructure, software development, and data sharing activities support measurement-based internet research, both at CAIDA and around the world, with focus on the health and integrity of the global Internet ecosystem. The executive summary is excerpted below:

Mapping the Internet. We continued to pursue Internet cartography, improving our IPv4 and IPv6 topology mapping capabilities using our expanding and extensible Ark measurement infrastructure. We improved the accuracy and sophistication of our topology annotation capabilities, including classification of ISPs and their business relationships. Using our evolving IP address alias resolution measurement system, we collected curated, and released another Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK).

Mapping Interconnection Connectivity and Congestion.
We used the Ark infrastructure to support an ambitious collaboration with MIT to map the rich mesh of interconnection in the Internet, with a focus on congestion induced by evolving peering and traffic management practices of CDNs and access ISPs, including methods to detect and localize the congestion to specific points in networks. We undertook several studies to pursue different dimensions of this challenge: identification of interconnection borders from comprehensive measurements of the global Internet topology; identification of the actual physical location (facility) of an interconnection in specific circumstances; and mapping observed evidence of congestion at points of interconnection. We continued producing other related data collection and analysis to enable evaluation of these measurements in the larger context of the evolving ecosystem: quantifying a given ISP’s global routing footprint; classification of autonomous systems (ASes) according to business type; and mapping ASes to their owning organizations. In parallel, we examined the peering ecosystem from an economic perspective, exploring fundamental weaknesses and systemic problems of the currently deployed economic framework of Internet interconnection that will continue to cause peering disputes between ASes.

Monitoring Global Internet Security and Stability. We conduct other global monitoring projects, which focus on security and stability aspects of the global Internet: traffic interception events (hijacks), macroscopic outages, and network filtering of spoofed packets. Each of these projects leverages the existing Ark infrastructure, but each has also required the development of new measurement and data aggregation and analysis tools and infrastructure, now at various stages of development. We were tremendously excited to finally finish and release BGPstream, a software framework for processing large amounts of historical and live BGP measurement data. BGPstream serves as one of several data analysis components of our outage-detection monitoring infrastructure, a prototype of which was operating at the end of the year. We published four other papers that either use or leverage the results of internet scanning and other unsolicited traffic to infer macroscopic properties of the Internet.

Future Internet Architectures. The current TCP/IP architecture is showing its age, and the slow uptake of its ostensible upgrade, IPv6, has inspired NSF and other research funding agencies around the world to invest in research on entirely new Internet architectures. We continue to help launch this moonshot from several angles — routing, security, testbed, management — while also pursuing and publishing results of six empirical studies of IPv6 deployment and evolution.

Public Policy. Our final research thrust is public policy, an area that expanded in 2015, due to requests from policymakers for empirical research results or guidance to inform industry tussles and telecommunication policies. Most notably, the FCC and AT&T selected CAIDA to be the Independent Measurement Expert in the context of the AT&T/DirecTV merger, which turned out to be as much of a challenge as it was an honor. We also published three position papers each aimed at optimizing different public policy outcomes in the face of a rapidly evolving information and communication technology landscape. We contributed to the development of frameworks for ethical assessment of Internet measurement research methods.

Our infrastructure operations activities also grew this year. We continued to operate active and passive measurement infrastructure with visibility into global Internet behavior, and associated software tools that facilitate network research and security vulnerability analysis. In addition to BGPstream, we expanded our infrastructure activities to include a client-server system for allowing measurement of compliance with BCP38 (ingress filtering best practices) across government, research, and commercial networks, and analysis of resulting data in support of compliance efforts. Our 2014 efforts to expand our data sharing efforts by making older topology and some traffic data sets public have dramatically increased use of our data, reflected in our data sharing statistics. In addition, we were happy to help launch DHS’ new IMPACT data sharing initiative toward the end of the year.

Finally, as always, we engaged in a variety of tool development, and outreach activities, including maintaining web sites, publishing 27 peer-reviewed papers, 3 technical reports, 3 workshop reports, 33 presentations, 14 blog entries, and hosting 5 workshops. This report summarizes the status of our activities; details about our research are available in papers, presentations, and interactive resources on our web sites. We also provide listings and links to software tools and data sets shared, and statistics reflecting their usage. sources. Finally, we offer a “CAIDA in numbers” section: statistics on our performance, financial reporting, and supporting resources, including visiting scholars and students, and all funding sources.

For the full 2015 annual report, see http://www.caida.org/home/about/annualreports/2015/

1st CAIDA BGP Hackathon brings students and community experts together

Thursday, February 18th, 2016 by Josh Polterock

We set out to conduct a social experiment of sorts, to host a hackathon to hack streaming BGP data. We had no idea we would get such an enthusiastic reaction from the community and that we would reach capacity. We were pleasantly surprised at the response to our invitations when 25 experts came to interact with 50 researchers and practitioners (30 of whom were graduate students). We felt honored to have participants from 15 countries around the world and experts from companies such as Cisco, Comcast, Google, Facebook and NTT, who came to share their knowledge and to help guide and assist our challenge teams.

Having so many domain experts from so many institutions and companies with deep technical understanding of the BGP ecosystem together in one room greatly increased the kinetic potential for what we might accomplish over the course of our two days.

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North Korean Internet outages observed

Tuesday, December 23rd, 2014 by Alberto Dainotti

As reported by Dyn Research, North Korea has experienced extremely unstable Internet connectivity in the last few days. We offer a near real-time (30-minute delayed) view of the BGP-visibility of the 4 IPv4 prefixes announced by STAR-KP, Ryugyong-dong (North Korea’s national telecommunications provider). This real-time view represents a sneak peek of the intended outcomes of our Internet outage detection and analysis project.

(Click image below to get real-time view of observed BGP-reachability to North Korea.)

outageNK-23dec14

BGP data sources (30 min delay): RIPE NCC’s Routing Information Service (RIS), University of Oregon Route Views Project

IMAPS Workshop on Internet Measurements and Political Science: Network Outages

Friday, October 10th, 2014 by Josh Polterock

On Wednesday 1 October 2014, CAIDA hosted a small invitation only workshop¬†that brought together researchers working on large-scale Internet outage detection and characterization with researchers from the political sciences with specific expertise in Internet censorship, political violence (including Internet connectivity disruption ordered by authoritarian regimes for censorship), and Internet penetration. Participants viewed and demonstration of and discussed CAIDA’s current data analysis platform for the exploration of historical and realtime Internet measurement data (named “Charthouse”), and possible extensions of the platform to support political science research related to ¬†macroscopic Internet outages.

 A primary use of our current platform is to detect/characterize large-scale Internet outages, i.e., entire regions or countries getting disconnected from the Internet for hours or days. We intend to extend the platform to enable more agile analysis, support larger datasets, improve geographic-based exploration and visualization, based on use case scenarios defined together with political scientists.

The workshop also included experts from the San Diego Supercomputer Center’s Data Enabled Scientific Computing Group, who provided valuable insights into methods for scalable analysis of large data sets requiring high performance computing platforms.¬† We currently plan to implement part of the Charthouse platform using the Spark/Shark data analytics stack.

Under the Telescope: Time Warner Cable Internet Outage

Friday, August 29th, 2014 by Vasco Asturiano

In the early hours of August 27th 2014, Time Warner Cable (TWC) suffered a major Internet outage, which started around 9:30am and lasted until 11:00am UTC (4:30am-6:00am EST). According to Time Warner, this disconnect was caused by an issue with its Internet backbone during a routine network maintenance procedure.

A few sources have documented the outage based on BGP and/or active measurements, including Renesys and RIPE NCC. Here we present a view from passive traffic measurement, specifically from the UCSD Network Telescope, which continuously listens for Internet Background Radiation (IBR) traffic. IBR is a constantly changing mix of traffic caused by benign misconfigurations, bugs, malicious activity, scanning, responses to spoofed traffic (backscatter), etc.  In order to extract a signal usable for our inferences, we count the number of unique source IP addresses (in IBR observed from a certain AS or geographical area) that pass a series of filters. Our filters try to remove (i) spoofed traffic, (ii) backscatter, and (iii) ports/protocols that generate significant noise.

Most of TWC’s Autonomous Systems seem to have been affected during the¬†time of the reported outage. Our indicators from the telescope¬†show a total absence of traffic¬†from TWC’s ASes, indicating a complete network outage.

Figure 1: Number of unique IBR source IPs (after filtering) observed per minute for the TWC ASes

Figure 1 shows the number of unique source IPs originated by TWC ASes per minute, as observed by the network telescope; we plot only TWC ASes from which there was any IBR traffic observed just before and after the event. For reference, these ASes are: AS7843, AS10796, AS11351, AS11426, AS11427, AS11955, AS12271 and AS20001.

TWC is a large Internet access provider in the United States, and this IBR signal can also reveal insight into the impact of this outage across the country. Figure 2 shows the same metric as Figure 1, but for source IPs across the entire country, indicating a drop of about 12% in the number of (filtered) IBR sources, which suggests that during the incident, a significant fraction of the US population lost Internet access.

Figure 2: Number of unique IBR source IPs (after filtering) observed in the US 

Drilling down to a regional level shows which US states seem to have suffered a larger relative drop in traffic.

Figure 3: Decrease ratio of unique IBR source IPs per US state 

Figure 3 compares the number of IBR sources observed in the 5 minute-interval just before the incident (9:25-9:30UTC) to the 5-minute interval after it (9:30-9:35UTC). The yellow to red color gradient represents the ratio at which a certain state’s IBR sources have decreased (redder¬†means larger drop). States that did not suffer a substantial relative decrease are shown in yellow. This geographical spread is likely correlated with market penetration of TWC connectivity within each state.

 

 

Syria disappears from the Internet

Wednesday, December 5th, 2012 by Alistair King and Alberto Dainotti

On the 29th of November, shortly after 10am UTC (12pm Damascus time), the Syrian state telecom (AS29386) withdrew the majority of BGP routes to Syrian networks (see reports from Renesys, Arbor, CloudFlare, BGPmon). Five prefixes allocated to Syrian organizations remained reachable for another several hours, served by Tata Communications. By midnight UTC on the 29th, as reported by BGPmon, these five prefixes had also been withdrawn from the global routing table, completing the disconnection of Syria from the rest of the Internet.

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Unsolicited Internet Traffic from Libya

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011 by Emile Aben

Amidst the recent political unrest in the Middle East, researchers have observed significant changes in Internet traffic and connectivity. In this article we tap into a previously unused source of data: unsolicited Internet traffic arriving from Libya. The traffic data we captured shows distinct changes in unsolicited traffic patterns since 17 February 2011.

Most of the information already published about Internet connectivity in the Middle East has been based on four types of data:

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