Archive for the 'Data Collection' Category

CAIDA’s 2022 Annual Report

Monday, July 10th, 2023 by kc

The CAIDA annual report summarizes CAIDA’s activities for 2022 in the areas of research, infrastructure, data collection and analysis. The executive summary is excerpted below:
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Unintended consequences of submarine cable deployment on Internet routing

Tuesday, December 15th, 2020 by Roderick Fanou

Figure 1: This picture shows a line of floating buoys that designate the path of the long-awaited SACS (South-Atlantic Cable System). This submarine cable now connects Angola to Brazil (Source: G Massala, https://www.menosfios.com/en/finally-cable-submarine-sacs-arrived-to-brazil/, Feb 2018.)

The network layer of the Internet routes packets regardless of the underlying communication media (Wifi, cellular telephony, satellites, or optical fiber). The underlying physical infrastructure of the Internet includes a mesh of submarine cables, generally shared by network operators who purchase capacity from the cable owners [2,11]. As of late 2020, over 400 submarine cables interconnect continents worldwide and constitute the oceanic backbone of the Internet. Although they carry more than 99% of international traffic, little academic research has occurred to isolate end-to-end performance changes induced by their launch.

In mid-September 2018, Angola Cables (AC, AS37468) activated the SACS cable, the first trans-Atlantic cable traversing the Southern hemisphere [1][A1]. SACS connects Angola in Africa to Brazil in South America. Most assume that the deployment of undersea cables between continents improves Internet performance between the two continents. In our paper, “Unintended consequences: Effects of submarine cable deployment on Internet routing”, we shed empirical light on this hypothesis, by investigating the operational impact of SACS on Internet routing. We presented our results at the Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM) 2020, where the work received the best paper award [11,7,8]. We summarize the contributions of our study, including our methodology, data collection and key findings.

[A1]  Note that in the same year, Camtel (CM, AS15964), the incumbent operator of Cameroon, and China Unicom (CH, AS9800) deployed the 5,900km South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL), which links Fortaleza to Kribi (Cameroon) [17], but this cable was not yet lit as of March 2020.

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CAIDA’s Annual Report for 2018

Tuesday, May 7th, 2019 by kc

The CAIDA annual report summarizes CAIDA’s activities for 2018, in the areas of research, infrastructure, data collection and analysis. Our research projects span Internet topology, routing, security, economics, future Internet architectures, and policy. Our infrastructure, software development, and data sharing activities support measurement-based internet research, both at CAIDA and around the world, with focus on the health and integrity of the global Internet ecosystem. The executive summary is excerpted below:
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CAIDA’s Annual Report for 2017

Tuesday, May 29th, 2018 by kc

The CAIDA annual report summarizes CAIDA’s activities for 2017, in the areas of research, infrastructure, data collection and analysis. Our research projects span Internet topology, routing, security, economics, future Internet architectures, and policy. Our infrastructure, software development, and data sharing activities support measurement-based internet research, both at CAIDA and around the world, with focus on the health and integrity of the global Internet ecosystem. The executive summary is excerpted below:
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CAIDA’s 2016 Annual Report

Tuesday, May 9th, 2017 by kc

[Executive summary and link below]

The CAIDA annual report summarizes CAIDA’s activities for 2016, in the areas of research, infrastructure, data collection and analysis. Our research projects span Internet topology, routing, security, economics, future Internet architectures, and policy. Our infrastructure, software development, and data sharing activities support measurement-based internet research, both at CAIDA and around the world, with focus on the health and integrity of the global Internet ecosystem. The executive summary is excerpted below:

Mapping the Internet. We continued to expand our topology mapping capabilities using our Ark measurement infrastructure. We improved the accuracy and sophistication of our topology annotations, including classification of ISPs, business relationships between them, and geographic mapping of interdomain links that implement these relationships. We released two Internet Topology Data Kits (ITDKs) incorporating these advances.

Mapping Interconnection Connectivity and Congestion. We continued our collaboration with MIT to map the rich mesh of interconnection in the Internet in order to study congestion induced by evolving peering and traffic management practices of CDNs and access ISPs. We focused our efforts on the challenge of detecting and localizing congestion to specific points in between networks. We developed new tools to scale measurements to a much wider set of available nodes. We also implemented a new database and graphing platform to allow us to interactively explore our topology and performance measurements. We produced related data collection and analyses to enable evaluation of these measurements in the larger context of the evolving ecosystem: infrastructure resiliency, economic tussles, and public policy.

Monitoring Global Internet Security and Stability. We conducted infrastructure research and development projects that focus on security and stability aspects of the global Internet. We developed continuous fine-grained monitoring capabilities establishing a baseline connectivity awareness against which to interpret observed changes due to network outages or route hijacks. We released (in beta form) a new operational prototype service that monitors the Internet, in near-real-time, and helps identify macroscopic Internet outages affecting the edge of the network.

CAIDA also developed new client tools for measuring IPv4 and IPv6 spoofing capabilities, along with services that provide reporting and allow users to opt-in or out of sharing the data publicly.

Future Internet Architectures. We continued studies of IPv4 and IPv6 paths in the Internet, including topological congruency, stability, and RTT performance. We examined the state of security policies in IPv6 networks, and collaborated to measure CGN deployment in U.S. broadband networks. We also continued our collaboration with researchers at several other universities to advance development of a new Internet architecture: Named Data Networking (NDN) and published a paper on the policy and social implications of an NDN-based Internet.

Public Policy. Acting as an Independent Measurement Expert, we posted our agreed-upon revised methodology for measurement methods and reporting requirements related to AT&T Inc. and DirecTV merger (MB Docket No. 14-90). We published our proposed method and a companion justification document. Inspired by this experience and a range of contradicting claims about interconnection performance, we introduced a new model describing measurements of interconnection links of access providers, and demonstrated how it can guide sound interpretation of interconnection-related measurements regardless of their source.

Infrastructure operations. It was an unprecedented year for CAIDA from an infrastructure development perspective. We continued support for our existing active and passive measurement infrastructure to provide visibility into global Internet behavior, and associated software tools and platforms that facilitate network research and operational assessments.

We made available several data services that have been years in the making: our prototype Internet Outage Detection and Analysis service, with several underlying components released as open source; the Periscope platform to unify and scale querying of thousands of looking glass nodes on the global Internet; our large-scale Internet topology query system (Henya); and our Spoofer system for measurement and analysis of source address validation across the global Internet. Unfortunately, due to continual network upgrades, we lost access to our 10GB backbone traffic monitoring infrastructure. Now we are considering approaches to acquire new monitors capable of packet capture on 100GB links.

As always, we engaged in a variety of tool development, and outreach activities, including maintaining web sites, publishing 13 peer-reviewed papers, 3 technical reports, 4 workshop reports, one (our first) BGP hackathon report, 31 presentations, 20 blog entries, and hosting 6 workshops (including the hackathon). This report summarizes the status of our activities; details about our research are available in papers, presentations, and interactive resources on our web sites. We also provide listings and links to software tools and data sets shared, and statistics reflecting their usage. Finally, we report on web site usage, personnel, and financial information, to provide the public a better idea of what CAIDA is and does.

For the full 2016 annual report, see http://www.caida.org/home/about/annualreports/2016/

Why IP source address spoofing is a problem and how you can help.

Friday, March 24th, 2017 by Bradley Huffaker

video: http://www.caida.org/publications/animations/security/spoofer-sav-intro
information: Software Systems for Surveying Spoofing Susceptibility
download: https://spoofer.caida.org/

This material is based on research sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Cyber Security Division (DHS S&T/HSARPA/CSD) BAA HSHQDC-14-R-B0005, and the Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland via contract number D15PC00188. Views should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Government, or the Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Help save the Internet: Install the new Spoofer client (v1.1.0)!

Sunday, December 18th, 2016 by Josh Polterock

The greatest security vulnerability of the Internet (TCP/IP) architecture is the lack of source address validation, i.e., any sender may put a fake source address in a packet, and the destination-based routing protocols that glue together the global Internet will get that packet to its intended destination. Attackers exploit this vulnerability by sending many (millions of) spoofed-source-address packets to services on the Internet they wish to disrupt (or take offline altogether). Attackers can further leverage intermediate servers to amplify such packets into even larger packets that will cause greater disruption for the same effort on the attacker’s part.

Although the IETF recommended best practices to mitigate this vulnerability by configuring routers to validate that source addresses in packets are legitimate, compliance with such practices (BCP38 and BCP84) are notoriously incentive-incompatible. That is, source address validation (SAV) can be a burden to a network who supports it, but its deployment by definition helps not that network but other networks who are thus protected from spoofed-source attacks from that network. Nonetheless, any network who does not deploy BCP38 is “part of the DDoS problem”.

Over the past several months, CAIDA, in collaboration with Matthew Luckie at the University of Waikato, has upgraded Rob Beverly’s original spoofing measurement system, developing new client tools for measuring IPv4 and IPv6 spoofing capabilities, along with services that provide reporting and allow users to opt-in or out of sharing the data publicly. To find out if your network provider(s), or any network you are visiting, implements filtering and allow IP spoofing, point your web browser at http://spoofer.caida.org/ and install our simple client.

This newly released spoofer v1.1.0 client has implemented parallel probing of targets, providing a 5x increase in speed to complete the test, relative to v.1.0. Among other changes, this new prober uses scamper instead of traceroute when possible, and has improved display of results. The installer for Microsoft Windows now configures Windows Firewall.

For more technical details about the problem of IP spoofing and our approach to measurement, reporting, notifications and remediation, see the slides from Matthew Luckie’s recent slideset, “Software Systems for Surveying Spoofing Susceptibility”, presented to the Australian Network Operators Group (AusNOG) in September 2016.

The project web page reports recently run tests from clients willing to share data publicly, test results classified by Autonomous System (AS) and by country, and a summary statistics of IP spoofing over time. We will enhance these reports over the coming months.

This material is based on research sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Cyber Security Division (DHS S&T/HSARPA/CSD) BAA HSHQDC-14-R-B0005, and the Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland via contract number D15PC00188. Views should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Government, or the Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Remote Peering Jedi

Friday, November 11th, 2016 by Josh Polterock

During the RIPE 73 IXP Tools Hackathon, Vasileios Giotsas, working with collaborators at FORTH/University of Crete, AMS-IX, University College, London, and NFT Consult, created the Remote Peering Jedi Tool to provide a view into the remote peering ecosystem. Given a large and diverse corpus of traceroute data, the tool detects and localizes remote peering at Internet Exchange Points (IXP).

To make informed decisions, researchers and operators desire to know who has remote peering at the various IXPs. For their RIPE hackathon project, the group created a tool to automate the detection using average RTTs from the RIPE Atlas’ massive corpus of traceroute paths. The group collected validation data from boxes inside the three large IXPs to compare to RTTs estimated via Atlas. The data suggests possible opportunities for Content Distribution Networks (CDN) to improve services for smaller IXPs. The project results also offer insights into how to interpret some of the information in PeeringDB. The project further examined how presence-informed RTT geolocation can contribute to identifying the location of resources. These results help reduce the problem space by exploiting the fact that the IP space of a given AS can appear where the AS has presence.

For more details, you can watch Vasileios’ presentation of the Remote Peering Jedi Tool. Or, visit the remote peering portal to see the tool in action.

remote-peering-jedi

CAIDA’s 2015 Annual Report

Tuesday, July 19th, 2016 by kc

[Executive summary and link below]

The CAIDA annual report summarizes CAIDA’s activities for 2015, in the areas of research, infrastructure, data collection and analysis. Our research projects span Internet topology, routing, security, economics, future Internet architectures, and policy. Our infrastructure, software development, and data sharing activities support measurement-based internet research, both at CAIDA and around the world, with focus on the health and integrity of the global Internet ecosystem. The executive summary is excerpted below:

Mapping the Internet. We continued to pursue Internet cartography, improving our IPv4 and IPv6 topology mapping capabilities using our expanding and extensible Ark measurement infrastructure. We improved the accuracy and sophistication of our topology annotation capabilities, including classification of ISPs and their business relationships. Using our evolving IP address alias resolution measurement system, we collected curated, and released another Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK).

Mapping Interconnection Connectivity and Congestion.
We used the Ark infrastructure to support an ambitious collaboration with MIT to map the rich mesh of interconnection in the Internet, with a focus on congestion induced by evolving peering and traffic management practices of CDNs and access ISPs, including methods to detect and localize the congestion to specific points in networks. We undertook several studies to pursue different dimensions of this challenge: identification of interconnection borders from comprehensive measurements of the global Internet topology; identification of the actual physical location (facility) of an interconnection in specific circumstances; and mapping observed evidence of congestion at points of interconnection. We continued producing other related data collection and analysis to enable evaluation of these measurements in the larger context of the evolving ecosystem: quantifying a given ISP’s global routing footprint; classification of autonomous systems (ASes) according to business type; and mapping ASes to their owning organizations. In parallel, we examined the peering ecosystem from an economic perspective, exploring fundamental weaknesses and systemic problems of the currently deployed economic framework of Internet interconnection that will continue to cause peering disputes between ASes.

Monitoring Global Internet Security and Stability. We conduct other global monitoring projects, which focus on security and stability aspects of the global Internet: traffic interception events (hijacks), macroscopic outages, and network filtering of spoofed packets. Each of these projects leverages the existing Ark infrastructure, but each has also required the development of new measurement and data aggregation and analysis tools and infrastructure, now at various stages of development. We were tremendously excited to finally finish and release BGPstream, a software framework for processing large amounts of historical and live BGP measurement data. BGPstream serves as one of several data analysis components of our outage-detection monitoring infrastructure, a prototype of which was operating at the end of the year. We published four other papers that either use or leverage the results of internet scanning and other unsolicited traffic to infer macroscopic properties of the Internet.

Future Internet Architectures. The current TCP/IP architecture is showing its age, and the slow uptake of its ostensible upgrade, IPv6, has inspired NSF and other research funding agencies around the world to invest in research on entirely new Internet architectures. We continue to help launch this moonshot from several angles — routing, security, testbed, management — while also pursuing and publishing results of six empirical studies of IPv6 deployment and evolution.

Public Policy. Our final research thrust is public policy, an area that expanded in 2015, due to requests from policymakers for empirical research results or guidance to inform industry tussles and telecommunication policies. Most notably, the FCC and AT&T selected CAIDA to be the Independent Measurement Expert in the context of the AT&T/DirecTV merger, which turned out to be as much of a challenge as it was an honor. We also published three position papers each aimed at optimizing different public policy outcomes in the face of a rapidly evolving information and communication technology landscape. We contributed to the development of frameworks for ethical assessment of Internet measurement research methods.

Our infrastructure operations activities also grew this year. We continued to operate active and passive measurement infrastructure with visibility into global Internet behavior, and associated software tools that facilitate network research and security vulnerability analysis. In addition to BGPstream, we expanded our infrastructure activities to include a client-server system for allowing measurement of compliance with BCP38 (ingress filtering best practices) across government, research, and commercial networks, and analysis of resulting data in support of compliance efforts. Our 2014 efforts to expand our data sharing efforts by making older topology and some traffic data sets public have dramatically increased use of our data, reflected in our data sharing statistics. In addition, we were happy to help launch DHS’ new IMPACT data sharing initiative toward the end of the year.

Finally, as always, we engaged in a variety of tool development, and outreach activities, including maintaining web sites, publishing 27 peer-reviewed papers, 3 technical reports, 3 workshop reports, 33 presentations, 14 blog entries, and hosting 5 workshops. This report summarizes the status of our activities; details about our research are available in papers, presentations, and interactive resources on our web sites. We also provide listings and links to software tools and data sets shared, and statistics reflecting their usage. sources. Finally, we offer a “CAIDA in numbers” section: statistics on our performance, financial reporting, and supporting resources, including visiting scholars and students, and all funding sources.

For the full 2015 annual report, see http://www.caida.org/home/about/annualreports/2015/

Toward a Congestion Heatmap of the Internet

Friday, June 3rd, 2016 by Amogh Dhamdhere

In the past year, we have made substantial progress on a system to measure congestion on interdomain links between networks. This effort is part of our NSF-funded project on measuring interdomain connectivity and congestion. The basic nugget of our technique is to send TTL-limited probes from a vantage point (VP) within a network, toward the near and the far end of an interdomain (border) link of that network, and to monitor diurnal patterns in the near and far-side time series. We refer to this method as “Time-Series Latency Probing”, or TSLP. Our hypothesis is that a persistently elevated RTT to the far end of the link, but no corresponding RTT elevation to the near side, is a signal of congestion at the interdomain link.

It turns out that identifying interdomain links from a VP inside a network is surprisingly challenging, for several reasons: lack of standard IP address assignment practices for inter domain links; unadvertised address space by ISPs; and myriad things that can go wrong with traceroute measurements (third-party addresses, unresponsive routers). See our paper at the 2014 Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) for a description of these issues. To overcome those challenges and identify network borders from within a network, we have developed bdrmap, an active measurement tool to accurately identify interdomain links between networks. A paper describing the bdrmap algorithms is currently under submission to IMC 2016.

Our second major activity in the last year has been to develop a backend system that manages TSLP probing from our set of distributed vantage points, collects and organizes data, and presents that data for easy analysis and visualization. A major goal of the backend system is to be adaptive, i.e., the probing state should adapt to topological and routing changes in the network. To this end, we run the bdrmap topology discovery process continuously on each VP. Every day, we process completed bdrmap runs from each monitor and add newly discovered interdomain links or update the probing state for existing links (i.e., destinations we can use to probe those links, and the distance of those links from our VP). We then push updated probing lists to the monitor. This adaptive process ensures that we always probe a relatively current state of thousands of interdomain links visible from our VPs.

Third, we have greatly expanded the scale of our measurement system. We started this project in 2014 with an initial set of approximately ten VPs in 5-6 access networks mostly in the United States. We are now running congestion measurements from over sixty Archipelago VPs in 39 networks and 26 countries around the world. Our Ark VPs have sufficient memory and compute power to run both the border mapping process and the TSLP probing without any issues. However, when we looked into porting our measurements to other active measurement platforms such as Bismark or the FCC’s measurement infrastructure operated by SamKnows, we found that the OpenWRT-based home routers were too resource-constrained to run bdrmap and TSLP directly. To overcome this challenge, we developed a method to move the bulk of the resource-intensive processing from the VPs to a central controller at CAIDA, so the VP only has to run an efficient probing engine (scamper) with a small memory footprint and low CPU usage. We have deployed a test set of 15 Bismark home routers in this type of remote configuration, with lots of help from the folks at the Bismark Project. Our next target deployment will be a set of >5000 home routers that are part of the FCC-SamKnows Measuring Broadband America infrastructure.

A fourth major advance we have made in the last year is in visualization and analysis of the generated time series data. We were on the lookout for a time series database to store, process and visualize the TSLP data. After some initial experimentation, we found influxDB to be well-suited to our needs, due to its ability to scale to millions of time series, scalable and usable read/write API, and SQL-like querying capability. We also discovered Grafana, a graphing frontend that integrates seamlessly with the influxDB database to provide interactive querying and graphing capability. Visualizing time series plots from a given VP to various neighbor networks and browsing hundreds of time series plots is now possible with a few mouse clicks on the Grafana UI. The figure below shows RTT data for 7 interdomain links between a U.S. access provider and a content provider over the course of a week. This graph took a few minutes to produce with influxDB and Grafana; previously this data exploration would have taken hours using data stored in standard relational databases.

 

dashboard_agg

As the cherry on the cake, we have set up the entire system to provide a near real-time view of congestion events. TSLP data is pulled off our VPs and indexed into the influxDB database within 30 minutes of being generated. Grafana provides an auto-refresh mode wherein we can set up a dashboard to periodically refresh when new data is available. There is no technical barrier to shortening the 30-minute duration to an arbitrarily short duration, within reason. The figure below shows a pre-configured dashboard with the real-time congestion state of interdomain links from 5 large access networks in the US to 3 different content providers/CDNs (network names anonymized). Several graphs on that dashboard show a diurnal pattern that signals evidence of congestion on the interdomain link. While drawing pretty pictures and having everything run faster is certainly satisfying, it is neither the goal nor the most challenging aspect of this project. A visualization is only as good as the data that goes into it. Drawing graphs was the easy part; developing a sustainable and scalable system that will keep producing meaningful data was infinitely more challenging. We are delighted with where we are at the moment, and look forward to opening up the data exploration interface for external users.

dashboard-ac

So what happens next? We are far from done here. We are currently working on data analysis modules for time series data with the goal of producing alarms, automatically and without human intervention, that indicate evidence of congestion. Those alarms will be input to a reactive measurement system that we have developed to distribute on-demand measurement tasks to VPs. We envision different types of reactive measurement tasks, e.g., confirming the latency-based evidence of congestion by launching probes to measure loss rate, estimating the impact on achievable throughput by running NDT tests, or estimating potential impacts to user Quality of Experience (QoE). The diagram below shows the various components of the measurement system we are developing. The major piece that remains is continuous analysis of the TSLP data, generating alarms, and pushing on-demand measurements to the reactive measurement system. Stay tuned!

system-diagram

The team: Amogh Dhamdhere, Matthew Luckie, Alex Gamero-Garrido, Bradley Huffaker, kc claffy, Steve Bauer, David Clark