ACM’s Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) is an annual highly selective venue for the presentation of Internet measurement and analysis research. The average acceptance rate for papers is around 25%. CAIDA researchers co-authored five papers and 3 posters that will be presented at this conference in Nice, France on October 25 – 27, 2022. We link to these publications below.

Investigating the impact of DDoS attacks on DNS infrastructure. Rafaele Sommese, KC Claffy, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, Arnab Chattopadhyay, Alberto Dainotti, Anna Sperotto, and Mattijs Jonker. 2022.  This paper describes a newly developed scalable method to map DDoS attacks targeting or affecting DNS infrastructure. The measurements reveal evidence that millions of domains experienced  DDoS attacks during the recent 17-month observation window. Most attacks did not observably harm DNS performance, but in some cases, a 100-fold increase in DNS resolution time was observed. This research corroborates the value of known best practices to improve DNS resilience to attacks, including the use of anycast and topological redundancy in nameserver infrastructure.

Mind Your MANRS: Measuring the MANRS Ecosystem. Ben Du, Cecilia Testart, Romain Fontugne, Gautam Akiwate, Alex C. Snoeren, and kc claffy. 2022. Mutually Agreed on Norms on Routing Security (MANRS) is an industry-led initiative to improve Internet routing security by encouraging participating networks to implement a set of recommended actions. The goal of the paper is to evaluate the current state of the MANRS initiative in terms of its participants, their routing behavior, and its impact on the broader routing ecosystem, and discuss potential improvements. The findings confirm that MANRS participants are more likely to follow best practices than other similar networks on the Internet. However, within MANRS, not all networks take the MANRS mandate with the same rigor. This study demonstrates the need to continually assess the conformance of members for the prosperity of the MANRS initiative, and the challenges in automating such conformance checks.

Retroactive Identification of Targeted DNS Infrastructure Hijacking. Gautam Akiwate, Rafaele Sommese, Mattijs Jonker, Zakir Durumeric, kc Claffy, Geofrey M. Voelker, and Stefan Savage. 2022. DNS infrastructure tampering attacks are particularly challenging to detect because they can be very short-lived, bypass the protections of TLS and DNSSEC, and are imperceptible to users. Identifying them retroactively is further complicated by the lack of fine-grained Internet-scale forensic data. This paper is the first attempt to make progress toward this latter goal. Combining a range of longitudinal data from Internet-wide scans, passive DNS records, and Certificate Transparency logs, we have constructed a methodology for identifying potential victims of sophisticated DNS infrastructure hijacking and have used it to identify a range of victims (primarily government agencies). The authors analyze possible best practices in terms of their measurability by third parties, including a review of DNS measurement studies and available data sets.

Stop, DROP, and ROA: Effectiveness of Defenses through the lens of DROP. Leo Oliver, Gautam Akiwate, Matthew Luckie, Ben Du, and kc claffy. 2022. Malicious use of the Internet address space has been a persistent threat for decades. Multiple approaches to prevent and detect address space abuse include the use of blocklists and the validation against databases of address ownership such as the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) databases and the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The authors undertook a study of the effectiveness of these routing defenses through the lens of one of the most respected blocklists on the Internet: Spamhaus’ Don’t Route Or Peer (DROP) list. The authors show that attackers are subverting multiple defenses against malicious use of address space, including creating fraudulent Internet Routing Registry records for prefixes shortly before using them. Other attackers disguised their activities by announcing routes with spoofed origin ASes consistent with historic route announcements. The authors quantify the substantial and actively-exploited attack surface in unrouted address space, which warrants reconsideration of RPKI eligibility restrictions by RIRs, and reconsideration of AS0 policies by both operators and RIRs.

Where .ru? Assessing the Impact of Conflict on Russian Domain Infrastructure.  Mattijs Jonker, Gautam Akiwate, Antonia Afnito, kc claffy, Alessio Botta, Geofrey M. Voelker, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, and Stefan Savage. 2022. The hostilities in Ukraine have driven unprecedented forces, both from third-party countries and in Russia, to create economic barriers. In the Internet, these manifest both as internal pressures on Russian sites to (re-)patriate the infrastructure they depend on (e.g., naming and hosting) and external pressures arising from Western providers disassociating from some or all Russian customers. This paper describes longitudinal changes in the makeup of naming, hosting, and certificate issuance for domains in the Russian Federation due to the war in Ukraine.

CAIDa also contributed to three extended abstracts:

“Observable KINDNS: Validating DNS Hygiene.” Sommese, Raffaele, Mattijs Jonker, kc claffy. ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) Poster, 2022.

“PacketLab – Tools Alpha Release and Demo.“ Yan, Tzu-Bin, Yuxuan Chen, Anthea Chen, Zesen Zhang, Bradley Huffaker, Ricky K. P. Mok, Kirill Levchenko, kc claffy. ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) Poster, 2022.

“A Scalable Network Event Detection Framework for Darknet Traffic.”Gao, Max, Ricky K. P. Mok, kc claffy. ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) Poster, 2022.

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